Communications - Scientific Letters of the University of Zilina 2011, 13(11):104-108 | DOI: 10.26552/com.C.2011.2A.104-108

Safety of Railway Systems and Formal/Semiformal Methods

Milan Slivka1
1 Railway Research Institute, j.s.c (VUZ), Prague, Czech Republic

The contribution deals with computer based railway safety systems. It shortly concerns problems associated with using computer systems in comparison with traditional safety systems. The attention is paid to formal and semiformal methods in development and approval of railways systems, seen in the context of standardization and legislation framework. The author summarizes current state of using formal and semiformal methods from whole life cycle point of view of railway safety system in the area of Slovak and Czech railways and possible reasons for their rare use.

Keywords: no keywords

Published: July 31, 2011  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Slivka, M. (2011). Safety of Railway Systems and Formal/Semiformal Methods. Communications - Scientific Letters of the University of Zilina, 13(2A), 104-108. doi: 10.26552/com.C.2011.2A.104-108
Share...
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. BITSCH, F.: Process Model for the Development of System Requirements Specifications for Railway Systems. Internnatonal Workshop on Software Specification of Safety Relevant Transportation Control Tasks, Fortschritt-Berichte VDI, Reihe 12, Verkehrstechnik/Fahrzeugtechnik, Nr. 535, 2002.
    2. CENELEC EN 50126: Railway applications: The Specification and Demonstration of Dependability - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), 1999.
    3. CENELEC EN 50128: Railway applications: Software for Railway Control and Protection Systems, 2001.
    4. CENELEC EN 50129 Railway Applications - Communications, Signalling and Processing Systems - Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signalling, 2003.
    5. CIMATTI, A., GIUNCHIGLIA, F., MONGARDI, G., PIETRA, B., ROMANO, D., TORIELLI, F., TRAVERSO, P.: Formal Validation & Verification of Software for Railway Control and Protection Systems: Experimental Applications in ANSALDO, Proc. of World Congress on Railway Research (WCRR'97), 1997. Vol. C, p. 467-473.
    6. Final Report. Safety-Related Complex Electronic Systems. Contract SMT 4CT97-2191, Project "Standards for Safety Related Complex Electronic Systems (STSARCES)", 2000. p. 137.
    7. Formal methods, Individual notations, methods and tools. [Online]. http://formalmethods.wikia.com/wiki/Formal_methods.
    8. FRANEKOVA, M., RASTOCNY, K: Modelling in Development of Safety-related Communication Systems, Communications - Scientific Letters of the University of Zilina, 2008. Vol 10, Nr.1, p 24-30. ISSN 1335-4205. Go to original source...
    9. CHUDACEK, V., LOCHMAN, L., STOLIN, M.: Navigation Satellite Systems in Railway Signalling? Signal+draht International 2002, No.5, p. 44-47. ISSN 0037-4997.
    10. ISAKSEN, U., BOWEN, J. P., NISSANKE, N.: System and Software Safety in Critical Systems. The University of Reading, Department of Computer Science, 1996.
    11. JANOTA, A.: Using Z Specification for Railway Interlocking Safety. Periodica Polytechnica, Ser. Transport Engineering, Hungary, 2000. Vol. 28, No. 1-2, p. 39-53. ISSN 0303-7800.
    12. RUSHBY, J.: Formal Methods and their Role in the Certification of Critical Systems Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, 1993.

    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.


    Return to the content